Dual receiver encryption (DRE) is an important cryptographic primitive introduced by Diament et al. at CCS'04, which allows two independent receivers to decrypt a same ciphertext to obtain the same plaintext. This primitive is quite useful in designing combined public key cryptosystems and denial of service attack-resilient protocols. In this paper, we obtain some results as follows.
Introduction
Dual receiver encryption, which was proposed by Diament, Lee, Keromytis and Yung (Diament et al. 2004) , is a special kind of public-key encryption which allows two independent users to decrypt a ciphertext to obtain the same plaintext by using their own secret keys. More precisely, in a DRE scheme, the encryption algorithm takes as input a message M and two receivers' independently generated public keys pk 1 and pk 2 and produces a ciphertext c. Once the receivers receive the ciphertext c, either of them can decrypt c and obtain the message M using their respective secret key. This primitive is quite useful in designing combined public key cryptosystems and denial of service attack-resilient protocols. Ten years later, S. Chow, Franklin and Zhang (Chow et al. 2014 ) refined model by combining an adaptively CCA secure encryption scheme and a non-interactive zero-knowledge protocol, while suffered low efficiency due to the prohibitively huge proof size. Later on, Chow, Franklin, and Zhang (Chow et al. 2014 ) proposed a CCA secure DRE scheme via combining a selective-tag weakly CCA-secure tag-based DRE (based on the tag-based encryption scheme in Kiltz (2006) ) and a strong one-time signature scheme, as well as other DRE instantiations for non-malleable and other properties 1 . Recently, Zhang et al. (2016a) constructed two provably secure IB-DRE schemes against adaptively chosen plaintext or ciphertext and chosen identity attacks based on an identity-based encryption scheme in (Waters 2005) .
Constructions from lattices. As studied in (Chow et al. 2014; Zhang et al. 2016a) , the DRE or IB-DRE can be viewed as a special instance of broadcast encryption (BE, for short) or identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE, for short) primitive which supports multiple recipients in an encryption system. So a construction of BE or IBBE implies a construction of DRE or IB-DRE. Georgescu (2013) constructed a tag-based anonymous hint system (Libert et al. 2012) under the ring learning with errors (RLWE) assumption. Combining an IND-CCA secure public key encryption (PKE) scheme and a strongly unforgeable one-time signature (OTS), we can get an IND-CCA secure BE scheme which is a conclusion in Libert et al. (2012) . Wang et al. (2015) presented a construction of BE which is indistinguishable against adaptively chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), based on the LWE problem. As for IBBE constructions, Wang and Bi (2010) proposed an adaptively secure IBBE scheme in the ROM, under the LWE assumption.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we pay attention to using lattice-based programmable hash function to construct the DRE and IB-DRE on lattices. Our schemes are constructed in the standard model and satisfy chosen-ciphertext or chosen-plaintext security based on the hardness of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem. Specifically, our works are stated as follows.
• We give a generic DRE construction from weak lattice-based programmable hash functions (wLPHF) with high min-entropy which defined in Zhang et al. (2016b) . The construction is indistinguishable against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) in the standard model. When instantiating with a wLPHF with high min-entropy, we get a concrete DRE scheme. We also compare our DRE scheme with the existing lattice-based DRE schemes. Please see more details in Table 1 .
• We also give a framework of IB-DRE from lattice-based programmable hash functions (LPHF) with high min-entropy. The construction is secure against chosen-plaintext and adaptively chosen-identity attacks (IND-ID-CPA). When instantiating with five concrete LPHFs with high min-entropy, we obtain five concrete IB-DRE schemes. The differences between our IB-DRE schemes and the existing lattice-based IB-DRE schemes are described in Table 2 .
Remark 1. This work is relevant to Zhang et al. (2018b) in which we constructed DRE ABB and IB-DRE ABB directly from the identity-based encryption scheme in Agrawal et al. (2010) , and it is a concrete case of our generic construction. As our growing understanding, we find that DRE ABB (or, IB-DRE ABB ) can be explained by using wLPHFs or LPHFs with high min-entropy. So, in this paper, we present a generic DRE (IB-DRE) construction from wLPHFs (LPHFs) with high min-entropy.
Preliminaries
Notations. Let λ be the security parameter, poly(λ) denotes the function f (λ) = O (λ c ) for some constant c and negl (λ) represents a negligible function. For positive integer n ∈ N, [ n] represents the set {1, · · · , n}. Z q denotes the ring of integer modulo q for integer q ≥ 2. Matrices are written as bold capital letters such as A, B, and column vectors are written as bold lowercase letters such as x, y. The transpose of the matrix A stands for A and [A|B] represents the matrix by concatenating A and B. (a) i and (A) i signify i-th element of a and the i-th column of A. I n and Inv n stand for the n × n identity matrix and the set consists of invertible matrices in Z n×n q , respectively.
Dual Receiver Encryption
Definition 1 (Dual receiver encryption (DRE) (Chow et al. 2014) ) A dual receiver encryption scheme DRE = (CGen DRE , Gen DRE , Enc DRE , Dec DRE ) is defined as follows:
• CGen DRE (1 λ ) → crs. The randomized common reference string (CRS) generation algorithm on input a security parameter λ, output a CRS crs.
• Gen DRE (crs) → (pk, sk). The randomized key generation algorithm on input crs, output a pair of public key and secret key (pk, sk). Run the Gen DRE twice independently to generate the key pairs (pk 1 , sk 1 ) and (pk 2 , sk 2 ) for two independent users. Without loss of generality, assume pk 1 and pk 2 are ordered based on lexicographic order.
• Enc DRE (crs, pk 1 , pk 2 , M) → c. The randomized encryption algorithm takes crs, two public keys pk 1 and pk 2 (such that pk 1 < d pk 2 ) and a message M as input, outputs a ciphertext c.
• Dec DRE (crs, pk 1 , pk 2 , sk j , c) → M. The deterministic decryption algorithm on input two public keys pk 1 and pk 2 , one secret keys sk j (j ∈ {1, 2}), and a ciphertext c, output a message M or ⊥. 
Security. DRE is said to be IND-CCA secure if for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, its advantage denoted as
is negligible in λ, where Exp ind−cca Table 3 .
Identity-Based Dual Receiver Encryption
Definition 2 (Identity-based dual receiver encryption (IB-DRE) (Zhang et al. 2016a )) An identity-based dual receiver encryption scheme IB-DRE = (Setup ID , KeyGen ID , Enc ID , Dec ID ) is defined as follows: 
Correctness. For all (PP, Msk)
Security. An IB-DRE scheme is said to be IND-ID-CPA secure if for any PPT adversary A, its advantage denoted as 
|PP|, |Msk| and |c| show the size of public parameters, master secret key and ciphertext, respectively. Q is the number bound of the secret key queries 
is negligible in λ, where Exp v] , and the probability is over the trapdoor td generated together with K .
A weak LPHF (wLPHF) is a relaxed version of LPHF with only a little difference that the H.TrapGen additionally takes X * as input. i.e.,
Definition 4 (Lattice-based programmable hash functions with high min-entropy (Zhang et al. 2016b) 
In a similar way, wLPHF with high min-entropy can be defined. 
Dual Receiver Encryption Construction
In this section, we will give the generic construction of DRE using the weak lattice-based programmable hash function with high min-entropy, and give the parameter selection and the security proof of the scheme. In order to obtain the IND-CCA security, we require two primitives: a strong one-time signature scheme OT S = (Gen OTS , Sig OTS , Vrf OTS ) which defined in Definition 6 in Appendix B and a
with high min-entropy, where γ is negligible and δ > 0 is noticeable. Let integers n, m, q, v, β be polynomials in the security parameter λ, and set m = m. Assume the message space M ∈ {0, 1} n and the size of verification key is λ bits , our DRE scheme DRE is as follows.
• CGen DRE (1 λ ): On input a security parameter λ, algorithm CGen DRE sets the parameters n, m, q as specified in Correctness and Parameter Selection as below. Then choose a uniformly random matrix 
• Dec DRE (crs, pk 1 , pk 2 , sk 1 , c): To decrypt a ciphertext c = (vk, c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , ρ) with a private key sk 1 = T A 1 , the algorithm Dec DRE does as follows:
Correctness and Parameter Selection
To make sure the correctness and the security proof works, we need to satisfy the following:
, the corresponding error terms are less than q/4 with overwhelming probability (i.e.
• TrapGen algorithm can works (i.e. m ≥ 6n log q).
• SampleLeft algorithms can operate (i.e., σ ≥
and s 1 (V 2 ) ≤ 1 + β respectively, and αq > max ω log m , ω log 2m = ω log 2m .
• The worst case to average case reduction works (i.e.
αq > 2 √ 2n).
To satisfy the above requirements, we set the parameters as follows:
Security Proof
Theorem 1 Let n, q, m ∈ Z, and α, β ∈ R be polynomials in the security parameter λ. For large enough v = poly(n), let H = (H.Gen, H.Eval) be any (1, v, β, γ , δ) 
By the security of OT S defined in Definition 6 in Appendix B, Pr[ Forge] is negligible. So in order to complete the proof of Theorem 1, we only need to prove the following lemma.
is negligible, assuming the DLWE q,n,n+2m,α assumption holds.
Proof (of Lemma 1). We will prove the lemma by a sequences of games. We show that if there is a PPT adversary A can breaks our DRE scheme with a non-negligible advantage (i.e. the success probability is 1 2 + ), then there exists a reduction can break the DLWE q,n,n+2m,α assumption with an advantage δ 2 . For simplicity, we set the trapdoor matrix B = G ∈ Z n×m q throughout the proof. Assume that the adversary A makes Q 1 and Q 2 times queries for Dec(sk 1 , ·) and Dec(sk 2 , ·), respectively, and v = Q 1 + Q 2 . In the following, define X i as the event that the challenger outputs 1 in Game i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}.
Game 1 This game is the same as the original experiment Exp ind−cca DRE,A (1 λ ) as described in Table 3 except that when the adversary A submits a valid ciphertext (vk * , (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ), ρ) to the decryption oracle, namely, the Forge event happens, C aborts and outputs a random bit. It is easy to see that
Game 2 This game is identical to the Game 1 except that C changes the generation of the public keys and the challenge ciphertext, and the way that the decrypt oracle answered.
Setup phase: For i = 1, 2, generate a pair of matrices
, and generate the key of the wLPHF as
Decryption queries: When A submits a valid ciphertext (vk = vk * , (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ), ρ), the challenger generates E 1 or E 2 as follows:
Challenge phase: Generate R vk * , S vk * and R vk * , S vk * using H.TrapEval algorithm as in Decryption queries phase, and set
By the well-distribution hidden matrices property of wLPHF,
Thus, with noticeable probability δ 2 , (c * 0 , c * 1 , c * 2 ) in the challenge ciphertext are as follows:
Game 3 This game is identical to the Game 2 except that C chooses the matrices A 1 and A 2 uniformly random from Z n×m q instead of generated by TrapGen, and generate the matrices E 1 and E 2 using SampleRight instead of SampleLeft. i.e., for j ∈[ n],
Game 4 This game is identical to the Game 3 except that we change the way that the challenge ciphertext is gener-
, and e 1,1 , e 2,1 $ ← D Z m ,αq , and set w = U s + e 0 , b 1 = A 1 s + e 1,1 , b 2 = A 2 s + e 2,1 . Then compute
Game 5 This game is identical to the Game 4 except that the challenge ciphertext generated as follows. The chal- 
Game 6 In this game, the challenge ciphertext generated as follows:
, and e 1,1 , e 2,1 , e 1,2 , e 2,2
.
q uniform randomly. At this time, ρ * is a signature on a random message. In this cases, the adversary A has no more advantage than random guess. Thus, Pr[
Analysis of Games.
Lemma 2 | Pr[
Proof This lemma can be proved by the the statistically close trapdoor keys and well-distributed hidden matrices properties of the wLPHF. 
Note that this subtle change from the standard LWE problem is done only for the convenience of the proof. Then it works as follows:
Setup phase: The same as in Game 4 . Decryption queries: During the game, decryption queries made by A are answered as in Game 4 .
Challenge phase: When A sends two messages m 0 , m 1 , B generates the challenge ciphertext as follows:
Guess phase: After being allowed to make additional queries, A guesses if it interacts with the challenger in Game 4 or Game 5 .
It is easy to see that if (U, A, w, b) is a valid LWE instance, then the view of A is the same as in Game 4 ; otherwise, the view of A corresponds to that in Game 4 . By the DLWE n,q,n+2m,α assumption, it holds that | Pr[ 
Identity-Based Dual Receiver Encryption Construction
In this section, we will give the generic construction of IB-DRE using lattice-based programmable hash functions, and give the parameter selection and the security proof of the scheme.
In our IB-DRE scheme, we require that the hash function H : {0, 1} λ → Z n×m q is a (1, v, β, γ , δ)-LPHF with high min-entropy which is defined in Definition 4, where γ is negligible and δ > 0 is noticeable. Let integers n, m, q, v, β be polynomials in the security parameter λ. And in our concrete construction, set m = m. Assume the identity space is ID = {0, 1} , and a message space M = {0, 1} n , our IB-DRE scheme IB-DRE is as follows:
• Setup ID (1 λ ): Given a security parameter λ, first set the parameters n, m, q as specified in parameter selection in Parameter selection as below. Then, obtain a pair of matrices (A, T A ) ∈ Z n×m q × Z m×m q by using TrapGen(1 n , 1 m , q), generate K 1 , K 2 by running H.Gen(1 λ ) twice independently, and choose a uniformly random matrix U ∈ Z n×n q . Finally, output PP = (n, m, q, A, K 1 , K 2 , U) and Msk = T A .
• KeyGen ID (PP, Msk, id 1st , id 2nd ∈ ID) : Given public parameters PP, a master key Msk, and identities id 1st , id 2nd , first compute • Dec ID (PP, sk id j , c): To decrypt a ciphertext c = (c 0 , c 1 ) with a private key sk id 1st = E id 1 , it computes b = c 0 − E id 1 · c 1,1 c 1,2 and let
Correctness and Parameter Selection
Parameter selection. To make sure the correctness and the security proof works, we need to satisfy the following
, the corresponding error term should be less than q/4 with overwhelming probability
• the TrapGen algorithm can works (i.e. m ≥ 6n log q)
• SampleLeft algorithms can operate (i.e. σ ≥
• ReRand algorithm can works (i.e. α /2α > s 1 (V)
≤ 1 + 2β, and αq > max ω log m , ω log 3m = ω log 3m • the worst case to average case reduction works (i.e. αq > 2 √ 2n)
Security Proof
Theorem 2 Let n, q, m ∈ Z, and α, β ∈ R be polynomials in the security parameter λ. For large enough v = poly(n), let H = (H.Gen, H.Eval) be any (1, v, β, γ , δ) the set of challenge ID and ID's for key queries. We will prove the theorem by a sequences of games where the first game is the real IND-ID-CPA game in Table 4 and in the last game the adversary has advantage zero. In each game, the challenger C selects a uniform coin b $ ← {0, 1} in the challenge phase, while finally A returns a guess bit b for b to the challenger. In the first game, the challenger setsb = b , these values might be different in the latter games. We define X i as the event thatb = b in Game i for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. As mentioned in the proof of Lemma 1, we fix the trapdoor matrix B = G ∈ Z n×m q throughout the proof.
Game 0 This game is the real IND-ID-CPA game. By the definition, it holds that
Game 1 This game is identical to Game 0 except that C changes the setup and challenge phases.
Setup phase: Same as in Game 0 except that generate
Challenge phase:
where
Game 2 This game is identical to Game 1 except that add an abort event that is independent of the adversary's view.
Guess phase: Finally, A outputs his guess b ∈ {0, 1} of b. C defines the following function 
At the guess phase, it also executes the artificial abort check.
Game 4 This game is identical to Game 3 except that change the way that the challenge ciphertext generated.
, and set w = U s + e 0 , b 1 = A s + e 1 . Compute
Game 5 In this game, the challenge ciphertext is generated as follows. Pick w
Game 6 In this game, the challenge ciphertext is generated as follows. Pick w 
Analysis of Games.

Lemma 8 If H is a LPHF with high min-entropy, then
Proof This lemma can be proved by the statistically close trapdoor keys property of LPHF in definition 3.
For i ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, let p i be the probability that the challenger does not abort in the abort check stage in Game i , and the probability in the artificial abort stage in Game i is defined as p i = Pr τ td 1 , td 2 , K 1 , K 2 , I * = 0 . Since the adversary might obtain some information of td 1 and td 2 from the challenge ciphertext, the probability p i might not be equal to p i . Formally, let i be the difference between p i and p i , i.e. i = | p i − p i |. If H is a (1, v, β, γ , δ) -LPHF, and Q ≤ v, then
Lemma 9
So as not to interrupt the proof of Theorem 2, we skip the proof of Lemma 9 for time being. If H is a (1, v, β, γ , δ) 
Lemma 10
-LPHF, and Q
Proof Note that abort check and the artificial abort in Game 2 and in Game 3 are identical. By the item 1, item 2 and item 3 of Lemma 16, those changes that generating the matrix A using TrapGen and secret key sk id
Proof This lemma can be proved by the property of ReRand in Lemma 17.
Lemma 12
Assume that the DLWE n,q,n+m,α assumption holds, then | Pr[
Proof we can construct an adversary B to against the DLWE n,q,n+m,α problem using the ability of A, where A is an adversary in Game 4 or Game 5 . The simulator B is given the LWE instance: . Pick a random coin b $ ← {0, 1}. Let the first n coefficients of u be w ∈ Z n q , and the last m coefficients b 1 ∈ Z m q . Then the challenge ciphertext generated as follows: 
And by Lemmas 10-14 again, we can obtain that 2 ≤ DLWE n,q,n+m,α + negl(λ). Thus, DLWE n,q,n+m,α ≥ δ 2 3 − negl(λ).
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 2, we need to prove the Lemma 9 by using the Lemma 28 in the full vision of Agrawal et al. (2010) , which is described as follows.
Lemma 15 (Lemma 28 in Agrawal et al. (2010) ) Let I * be a (Q + 1)-ID tuple {id * , {id j } j∈ [Q] } denoted the challenge ID along with the queried ID's, and η(I * ) the probability that an abort does not happen in Game 2 . Let η max = max η(I * ) and η min = min η(I * ). For i = 1, 2, we set X i be the event thatb = b at the end of Game 1 . Then
Proof (of Lemma 9) As the generations of ( td 1 , K 1 ) and ( td 2 , K 2 ) are independent, by the well-distributed hidden matrices property of the H, it holds that
According 
Substitute them and the value of λ into the inequality in Lemma 15, we can get
Instantiation of Generic DRE construction
As said in Zhang et al. (2016b) , the selectively secure IBE in Agrawal et al. (2010) 
which was introduced in Zhang et al. (2018b) , output
The associating algorithms H ABB .TrapGen and H ABB .TrapEval are defined as follows:
The above function H ABB is a (1, v, O( √ m) , negl(λ), 1)-wLPHF with high min-entropy (Zhang et al. 2016b) , and using it to instantiate our generic DRE construction, we can get the concrete DRE ABB scheme in Table 5 .
Instantiations of Generic IB-DRE construction
As mentioned in Zhang et al. (2019) , the adaptively secure and anonymous IBE schemes in Agrawal et al. (2010); Yamada (2016); Yamada (2017) naturally imply instantiations of LPHFs with high min-entropy. In this section, we will use them to instantiate our generic IB-DRE constructions. 
IB-DRE construction from LPHF H
Enc DRE (crs, pk 1 , pk 2 , m ∈ {0, 1} n ) : 
Dec DRE (crs, pk 1 , pk 2 , sk 1 , c) :
The associating algorithms H ABB .TrapGen and H ABB .TrapEval are defined as follows: Zhang et al. (2018b) , and h i
-LPHF with high min-entropy (Zhang et al. 2016b ), where t is the smallest integer satisfying q t > 2v. And using it to instantiate our generic IB-DRE construction, we can get our concrete IB-DRE ABB scheme in Table 6 .
IB-DRE constructions from other LPHFs with high min-entropy
In this section, we plug the LPHFs with high min-entropy corresponding to the adaptively secure IBE schemes in Zhang et al. (2016b); Yamada (2016); Yamada (2017) into our generic IB-DRE construction, and obtain some Table 6 IB-DRE ABB scheme
Similarly, it obtain sk id 2nd = E id2 such that A|A id2 · E id2 = U.
Output the secret key sk
Compute A id1 , A id2 as above. Pick s $ ←Z n q , e 0 $ ←D Z n ,αq , e 1,1 , e 1,2 , e 1,3 
Dec ID (PP, sk idj , c):
concrete IB-DRE schemes on lattice in the standard model. Please see more details in Table 7 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we give the frameworks of the DRE and IB-DRE by using the (weak) LPHFs with high min-entropy on lattice. The constructions are based on the learning with error assumption in the standard model and have adaptively secure. And when instantiating with the concrete (w)LPHFs with high min-entropy, we get a concrete DRE scheme and five concrete IB-DRE schemes.
Endnote
1 Note that Chow et al. (2014) also gave two generic DRE constructions: one is combining Naor-Yung "twokey" paradigm (Naor and Yung 1990 ) with Groth-Sahai proof system (Groth and Sahai 2008) , the other is from lossy trapdoor functions (Peikert and Waters 2011) .
Appendix A: Lattice Background
For a prime q, the positive integers n, m and A ∈ Z n×m q , we define the m-dimensional integer lattices as: q (A) = {y : y = A s for some s ∈ Z n } and ⊥ q (A) = {y : Ay = 0 mod q}.
Let S = {s 1 , · · · , s n } be a set of vectors in R m . The Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of the vectors s 1 , · · · , s n is denoted as S = { s 1 , · · · , s n }. S := the length of the longest vector in S. For a real matrix R, let s 1 (R) = max u =1 Ru (respectively, R ∞ = max r i ∞ ). Regev (2005) showed that for αq > 2 √ 2n, solving the decisional version LWE q,n,m,α (DLWE q,n,m,α ) problem is (quantumly) as hard as approximating the SIVP and GapSVP problems within O(n/α) factors in the worst case.
Lemma 16 Let p, q, n, m be positive integers with q ≥ p ≥ 2 and q prime, the following holds:
• ( Ajtai (1999); Alwen and Peikert (2009) ): When m ≥ 6n log q , the randomized algorithm TrapGen(1 n , 1 m , q) outputs a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q which is statistically close to uniform in Z n×m q , and a matrix T A ∈ Z m×m which is a basis of ⊥ q (A), satisfying T A ≤ O( n log q) with overwhelming probability.
• ( Cash et al. (2010) , an invertible matrix S ∈ Z n×n q , a vector u ∈ Z n q and σ ≥ T G · s 1 (R) · ω( log m), outputs a vector r ∈ Z 2m q which is statistically close to D u q (F),σ where F =[ A|AR + SG].
• (Gadget Matrix Micciancio and Peikert (2012) 
When m > n log q , there exists a full-rank matrix G ∈ Z n×m q which is called gadget matrix, satisfies that Q 2ϕ § IB-DRE AFF ω(log n) poly(n) poly(n) poly(n) O n 0.5 O 3 4 Q 2 * , |PP|, |Msk| and |c| show the size of public parameters, master secret key and ciphertext, respectively. is the length of identity and Q is the bound of secret key queries. † Assume that η such that n η > log q = O(log n), and c is the smallest integer satisfying that n c ≥ Q + 1. ‡ c = c 1 + c 2 where c 1 , c 2 satisfying n c 1 2 ≥ Q + 1 and n −c2 ≤ §ϕ > 1 is the constant which satisfying s = 1 − 2 − 1 , where s ∈ {0, 1} is the relative distance of the underlying error correcting code. We can take ϕ as close to 1 as one wants the lattice ⊥ q (G) has a public known basis T G ∈ Z m×m q with T G ≤ √ 5.
In Katsumata and Yamada (2016) , Katsuamta and Yamada introduced the "Noise Rerandomization" lemma which plays an important role in the security proof because of creating a well distributed challenge ciphertext.
Lemma 17 (Noise Rerandomization (Katsumata and Yamada 2016) 
